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Masculinist Theory and Romantic Authorship,
Or Hawthorne, Politics, Desire
David Greven

I

n the powerful hands of critics such Sacvan Bercovitch, Jonathan
Arac, and John Carlos Rowe, Nathaniel Hawthorne as artist and person assumes the shape of an unattractively conservative writer whose
works alternately achieve political consensus through the reconciliation of
opposing points of view, all ostensibly given their platform yet fused into
one, reactionary position of social inaction (Bercovitch); reveal a writer
whose politics facilitated the slave trade even as it pulled the curtain over
the oncoming onslaught of the Civil War (Arac); ingeniously innovate
the literary means of American global colonization (Rowe). To read such
bold and authoritative critics on Hawthorne is to believe that a reactionary and racist writer continues to occupy a stable position in American
high school and college curriculums. In this essay, taking these critics’
positions as metonymic of an entire approach to literature in academic
writing—a cross-fertilized version of Foucauldian and Marxian theories,1
which in its most common application in literary criticism and theory
we can, crudely, call the “Bad Politics” school of leftist criticism2—I will
demonstrate that, however valid and illuminating their positions prove
to be, these critics’ views of Hawthorne not only mutilate Hawthorne’s
work but also rely on surprisingly heterosexist and masculinist approaches
to the study of imaginative literature. Considering the work of these critics on Hawthorne allows us to examine a particular, influential trend in
academic writing from the 1980s to the present.
What is most distressing about this political critique of Hawthorne’s
work is the way in which it frames what is and is not “political.” Gender
gets mentioned, dutifully, but there is little sustained engagement with
gendered themes. Perhaps this problem stems from biases and blind
spots inherent in Marxism: as Joan Wallach Scott observes, “within Marxism, the concept of gender has long been treated as the by-product of
changing economic structures; gender has had no independent analytic
status of its own.”3 The relegation of gendered issues to the sidelines
confuses as much as it disturbs; as critics such as Helene Moglen remind
us, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fiction reacted primarily to the
New Literary History, 2009, 39: 971–987
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social and psychological strains of the modern sex-gender system, so
the failure to include a sustained analysis of the gendered dynamics of
politics is a considerable blind spot.4 Yet, from another perspective, questions of gender may be said to preoccupy leftist literary criticism. In a
remarkably obvious manner, politics here connotes the public sphere of
male ideas, ideas put into publicly visible place and the effects of men
of action, or, more pertinently in Hawthorne’s case, the effects created
by a failure to act.
The leftist treatment of a Romantic author like Hawthorne evokes
longstanding debates in criticism over American literature itself, the
asseveration of the superiority of realism over romance that has been
with us at least since Henry James in his critical study of Hawthorne. A
“prominent function of claiming to be a realist or a naturalist,” argues
Michael Davitt Bell, “was to provide assurance to one’s society and oneself
that one was a ‘real’ man rather than an effeminate ‘artist.’”5 Lionel Trilling’s essay “Reality in America” remains relevant for our current critical
predicament.6 As Americanists, we have not yet budged from our position at what Trilling described as “the dark and bloody crossroads where
literature and politics meet.” “One does not go there gladly,” remarks
Trilling, “but nowadays it is not exactly a matter of free choice whether
one does or does not go” (9). Trilling continues to pose many political
problems as a critic, as evinced by his vexing denigration of Steinbeck
and Dreiser. (Jonathan Schaub’s study of Cold War literary criticism offers
several useful insights into the postwar criticism in which Trilling played
so vital a part, particularly in what Schaub calls the “liberal narrative”
guiding postwar thought.7) But Trilling’s nowadays are our nowadays. We
continue to be vexed by this “deadly sin,” the “turning away from reality”
(5), as Trilling put it. Despite the manner in which he himself questioned
the “reality,” or lack thereof, in Hawthorne’s fiction, Henry James, wrote
Trilling, is traditionally put, “by liberal critics,” “to the ultimate question:
of what use, of what political use, are his gifts and their intention?” (9),
the same kinds of questions raised over Hawthorne today (and James,
still, and many others). Leftist critiques to the contrary, however, Trilling,
in Hawthorne’s defense, wrote that “Hawthorne was dealing beautifully
with realities, with substantial things . . . dealing exactly with reality” (7).
Whose reality is it, and what, exactly, constitutes reality?
“In the study of American literature,” wrote William C. Spengemann,
“where nationality, as [René] Wellek noted, is not linguistically definite,
nonliterary history has been seen as especially crucial to literary history.”8
Responding to this “deep suspicion regarding literary values,” conducted
by historians and historicist literary critics, Spengemann concluded,
“Granted its premises, the historical method is virtually guaranteed to
produce a literary history that is not a history of literature.”9 Our cur-
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rent (leftist) critical practice, conducted by the current generation of
historicist literary critics, devotes itself entirely to the enumeration and
elucidation of what Philip Fisher called the “hard facts” of American
history. The importance of these facts—especially racial oppression
embodied most prominently in the conjoined horrors of slavery and
Indian removal—indubitably endures. But the preponderance of hard
facts criticism begs the question: is there a place for soft facts—for beauty,
desire, eros, the aesthetic, for love, for what Hélène Cixous calls, in the
context of Edgar Allan Poe’s fiction, “the soft and mysterious violence
of writing”?10 Roughly speaking, the hard facts, Bad Politics school of
American literary theory and criticism focuses on historical “reality” at
the expense of other concerns.
The underlying anxiety would appear to be that talking about soft facts
makes critics soft; the accumulation of hard facts and commensurately
hard approaches to them pleasingly hardens the critic’s work, makes it
more solid and substantial. Political criticism emerges as a curious means
of reestablishing a coherent masculinism always already threatened by
the feminizing enterprise of literature. In a provocative essay, James J.
Sosnoski writes that, “It is remarkable still that the main opponents to New
Criticism in the 1960s did not question the view that literary criticism,
even though it could not muster exacting objectivity, should be modeled on the sciences.” As a result, for “the most part, modern criticism
is based on the notion that readings can be objective, impersonal and
detached, that there is a discipline of literary criticism.”11 The objectivist,
empirical standards that control a great deal of leftist thought preclude
the messy, “feminine” qualities, to wax Cixousian, of emotional engagement, personal meaning, and responses to beauty that are also and just
as deeply integral to literary experience.
In his study Criticism and Social Change, Frank Lentricchia categorizes
three kinds of intellectual: the radical intellectual, who fights for the
working class; the traditional intellectual, a cosmopolitan connoisseur
of ideas who claims to maintain a position outside power and politics
and champions disinterested critical values and universal truths; and
the kind of intellectual he wants leftist critics to be, the specific intellectual, who struggles to transform his or her immediate institutional
and intellectual domain.12 The specific intellectual, focusing (rather
monastically, like Hawthorne’s ill-fated scholar Fanshawe) intently on
his own specific areas of study, should not distract himself or step out
of his place through connections with local and public forms of activism
but, instead, should do what he was trained to do—critique prevailing
ideological structures and their discursive articulations. Lentricchia’s
association of the traditional intellectual with qualities such as cosmopolitanism and connoisseurship illuminates many of the attitudes and,
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frankly, the biases of leftist critique. Though Lentricchia’s model of the
traditional critic might suggest considerable possibilities for pleasure as
well as insight in its evocation of figures such as the debonair, decadent
bachelor, for leftist criticism fictionists or critics who exude such inactive, useless qualities are far too louche, far too decadent—they are not
only indolent outsiders, but also threatening, perhaps even pernicious.
It is a negative model of the feminized nonproductive mind, the insufficiently politicized critic as fop. “The root idea” of effeminacy, writes
Alan Sinfield, “is a male falling away from the purposeful reasonableness
that is supposed to constitute manliness, into the laxity and weakness
conventionally attributed to women. . . . The function of effeminacy, as
a concept, is to police sexual categories, keeping them pure.” Crucially
for our discussion, “the effects of such policing extend vastly beyond
lesbians and gay men . . . the whole order of sexuality and gender is
pinioned by the fears and excitements that gather around the allegedly
inappropriate distribution of gender categories.”13 Hawthorne and the
insufficiently politicized (and implicitly male) critic both fall into the
dread category of effeminacy in their precarious loss of the purposeful
reasonableness of conscientiously “political” goals and aims.
Leftist criticism reveals that a deep-seated anxiety over which role
literature should play in our culture endures; despite the validity of
the ideological concerns brought to bear on literature, being forced
to bear the burden of accounting for and negotiating the ideological
problems of not only its own historical milieu but also our own is an
undue burden to place on most texts and most authors, especially when,
as in Hawthorne’s case, their ideological profile is so blurry, such a cross
between conservative and radical qualities. A good deal of the anxious
strong-arming of literary works in leftist criticism can be read as an
attempt to quell anxieties over the eternal discomfort produced by literature, with its goads to sensual lassitude, in a hard, materialist culture
still dominated by Puritan standards of utility. More directly relevant,
the enormous difficulty at the heart of leftist criticism is its assumption
that all readers share its values, all writers must share its values, and any
readers and writers who do not share these values run the risk of being
called immoral. This is not an exaggeration: Eric Cheyfitz, going far
beyond Bercovitch and Arac (though not Rowe), accuses Hawthorne of
an “immoral passivity.” 14
To make my specific concerns clearer, I will closely engage with the
arguments of Rowe and Arac in the following sections. The goal of this
engagement will be to demonstrate the ways in which an occluded yet
palpable gendered politics undergirds the stated political agendas of even
the most sophisticated post-Trilling leftist critique.
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Rowe’s Globalizing Hawthorne
The title of the recent collection of essays edited by Millicent Bell,
Hawthorne and the Real, signals the current preoccupations of Hawthorne
scholarship. Almost all of the essays in the collection, Bell writes, exhibit
“a common intent to explore, in one way or another, in one or another
of Hawthorne works, the relation of his imagination to ‘the real’—that
is, to the social reality he sometimes claimed to find uninteresting or
unrepresentable. They make an argument for the interpretation of
Hawthorne’s writings as more expressive of the objective common conditions and public issues of his day than has been conceded until quite
recently.”15 It is difficult to know in which manner Bell means “recently,”
since the volume appears to be in keeping with the trend to interrogate
Hawthorne’s association with real-world concerns undertaken since the
1980s. In any event, the title overinscribes a particular understanding of
“real” issues in Hawthorne—not the domain of the unrepresentable that
the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan famously described as the “real,”
but precisely that which presumably exists always to be represented, the
real of social reality. Lacan’s brilliantly counterintuitive terming of the
mysterious and indescribable as that which is the real conjures up far too
many tangled issues to go into here, but, for now, what I wish to suggest is
that the associations of the Lacanian real can stand in for what has been
consciously eschewed in Hawthorne criticism, in this regard metonymic
of current academic practice: any concerns that are unquantifiable and
unclassifiable, that do not lend themselves easily to critical discussion,
research, and argument, in short, the imaginative project of literature.
(That Bell is the editor of this volume itself makes a political point as a
microcosmic narrative of critical history; the author of a famous 1960s
book on Hawthorne and aesthetics, Hawthorne’s View of the Artist, is now
the editor of a volume that places Hawthorne’s social reality, not his
aesthetics, at the forefront.)
The attempt to blast away at the wall of presumed indifference to
social realities that Hawthorne put up throughout his career is most
likely a salutary one, and this collection boasts a number of penetrating,
insightful, necessary essays that, if any doubts existed before, confirms
the reality that Hawthorne was a political figure of great importance in
his own era, and that the very issues to which Hawthorne always claimed
to be indifferent—abolition, race, women’s rights, national politics—are
central to his oeuvre. In no manner do I dispute the urgency of these
concerns. My concern here is the manner in which a particular approach to Hawthorne says far less about this writer’s work than it does
about academic criticism and shared agendas for the study of American
literature.
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In his essay in Hawthorne and the Real, “Nathaniel Hawthorne and
Transnationality,” John Carlos Rowe baldly states his agenda in his first
paragraph. Rowe, disputing Henry James’s negative assessment of Hawthorne’s provincialism, writes, “Today we are interested in the history of
our current global situation and the transnational forces that challenge
the nation state and other traditional sociopolitical organizations. In order
to understand these phenomena, we would do well to study Hawthorne’s
fiction, which represents an older world transformed by the new forces
of modernization, first announced by the industrial revolution in England and made more urgent and dangerous in the expansionist frenzy
of Jacksonian America.”16 Rowe explicitly sees his work as an updating of
Bercovitch’s influential 1991 study The Office of The Scarlet Letter; his argument fuses Bercovitch and postcolonial theory. Bercovitch wrote about
Hawthorne’s desire to create consensus through the reconciliation of
opposing points of view, all of which bolster an ultimate affirmation of
liberal individualism; Rowe, extending the Bercovitchian position, goes
further, arguing that “the abstraction of liberal individualism from its
historical and geopolitical possibility in nineteenth-century America is
Hawthorne’s way of contributing to what today we recognize as cultural
colonialism”; indeed, Hawthorne’s “romantic regionalism is a trick that
serves expansionist political and cultural purposes” (91). The Salem
custom house, where Hawthorne worked and from which he was fired
before the publication of The Scarlet Letter and which he made the focus
of the ambiguous essay that precedes the novel, “where the identification
of products according to their national origins” leads to the determination of what is “permissible and forbidden within the republic,” is the
kind of “aesthetic, transnational space” that for Rowe “marks precisely
the national border as the model for other boundaries” (91). Rowe
seizes upon the implications of the term “citizen” in Hawthorne’s famous
phrase in “The Custom-House” essay, “I am a citizen of somewhere else,”
linking Hawthorne’s use of citizen with “that of the citoyen declared by
the French Revolution” (92). For Rowe, such a linkage could only be
“ironic,” since Hawthorne “links citizenship with the Terror and thus
follows the conservative interpretation of how the French revolt against
monarchy was a democratic failure” (93). Resisting any claim of literature
as a “utopian” space, Rowe’s major concern here is with what he calls
Hawthorne’s self-endowed “transmigratory” ability to inhabit a whirling
array of different spaces, and thereby defy not only social and national,
but also temporal borders—indeed, constraints of any kind. Hawthorne,
with his references to classical antiquity and the witch-hunting Puritan
American past, can roam the centuries as well as nations, and as such
an unmoored—yet always squarely, firmly fixed American—citizen,
Hawthorne can travel anywhere, at least inasmuch as his authorial self
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and created worlds give him license to do so. One might argue that the
onanistic rapture thus suggested by this endlessly mobile imaginative
agency sounds rather appealing, yet Rowe has neither time nor truck
with pleasure here: transmigratory fiction as a “literary contribution to
social practice tends to be conservative, insofar as it attempts to regulate
a trauma that threatens social order” (95). This conservative maneuver is
the “aesthetic sleight-of-hand by which the literary author (Hawthorne),
the marginalized and abused woman (Hester), and the bastard child
(Pearl) are transformed into leaders of a spiritual and moral revival
of an otherwise corrupt U.S. democracy.” Echoing Bercovitch, Rowe
asserts that Hawthorne uses “his imaginative play with political dissent
within the perfectly recognizable conventions of American self-reliant
individualism,” all in the covert attempt to win the “ruling-class authority” to which he aspires (97–98).
The chief ideological perniciousness of The Scarlet Letter for Rowe appears to be that its heroine, Hester Prynne, trades in “her potential for
overt social revolution” for “the subtler, psychological transformation
she helps Dimmesdale [the minister with whom she committed the sin
of adultery and the father of her illegitimate child] achieve on his own,”
which mirrors Hawthorne’s own transmogrification of a personal desire
for political revolution into what Rowe, citing himself in an earlier essay,
calls “aesthetic dissent,” “the romantic idealist assumption that rigorous
reflection on the processes of thought and representation constitutes in
itself a critique of social reality and effects a transformation of the naive
realism that confuses truth with social convention” (97). Hawthorne’s
failed political activism is not just conservative but also hopelessly
“naive,” self-deluded.
Many, probably most of us, in academia would agree more or less with
the outlying goals of Rowe’s essay: to interrogate U.S. global hegemony
and critique the national megalomania that inspires it. What is disturbing,
however, is the assumption that a literary character—and an author—must
be a political revolutionary in order to be fully realized, to say nothing
of truly inspired and inspiring, and, implicitly, truly moral. Social revolution here utterly, unquestionably trumps subtle interior change, and,
implicitly, any subjective experience. Radicalism not only happens on
the outside, it is projected outward, it has material implications, obvious,
visible, thoroughly empirical effects in the material and social world.
Hawthorne’s romancer’s ability to inhabit multiple times and places in
the act of imaginative authorship necessarily assumes a suspicious cast
precisely because it is about myriad possibilities that have no clear, tangible outcomes, save the literary objects, printed books, which do not
connote empirical achievement—“Here is the result of my transmigratory fantasy”—so much as they reify the troublesome, if not altogether
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immoral, uselessness of literary fantasy, of literature itself. Considered
in any depth at all, this absolutely utilitarian view of the usefulness of
fantasy—which amounts to its own colonization of fantasy (in the Freudian sense of “phantasy”) for its own ends—and literature smacks sharply
of the era in which novels were considered immoral, goads to sensual
indolence, back even further to Puritan categories of the necessary and
the immoral in life. A deep, abiding strain in the Bad Politics school of
Hawthorne criticism is the one inherited from the very beginnings of
our national culture, an utter revulsion against uselessness figured as
and through multivalent categories of luxury. “No figure,” as Lori Merish
writes, “was as universally employed in discussions of luxury during the
Enlightenment than the representation of luxury as ‘feminizing.’”17 It is
precisely in this implicit view of authorial luxury that a covert—though,
I hope, unwitting—gendered war on the “apolitical” author continues
to be conducted.
Continuing the ambiguous academic critical practice of ransacking
letters and journals for evidence of an author’s “real” character, Rowe
uses Hawthorne’s Italian Notebooks for further evidence of his indifference
to politics. “He takes comfort and even finds a certain charm in French
troops occupying Rome. . . .What seems remarkable in Hawthorne’s otherwise touristic impressions is the pleasure he takes in the cosmopolitan
atmosphere in Rome and Italy, even when it is an effect of the political
violence reshaping modern Europe” (99). Hawthorne’s indifference to
the political tumult in Europe manifests itself for Rowe most amply in
the novel Hawthorne wrote in the aftermath of his European travels, the
1860 The Marble Faun. “Hawthorne Americanizes nineteenth-century Italy
by projecting onto it his own fantasy of the transnational ideal for the
American citizen, drawing both on the aura of ancient imperial Rome
in its global reach and at the same time emphasizing the American
transumption of this ‘ruined’ heritage” (100). Again linking his project
to Bercovitch’s, Rowe positions The Marble Faun as another work that
represents the transmutation of personal ambitions for revolution into
what Bercovitch called a “vision of continuity.”18 Worse, The Marble Faun
tames “the threats of Europe’s mid-century, nationalist revolutions and
the international claims of women’s rights,” thereby “turning their related
social problems into the aesthetic concerns and allegorical figures of an
American romance”—no mean feat, and a truly “miraculous transformation” indeed. This final completed romance is Hawthorne’s “contribution
to the transnational ambitions of U.S. ideology at the beginning of the
Civil War and prophetically anticipates how U.S. cultural work today incorporates the histories and cultures of other peoples for its own glory
and their control” (106).
A transformation of a different kind occurs in Rowe’s work: Rowe
processes the perplexities and perversities, the irreconcilable and dis-
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cordant, the wild and unstable qualities of Hawthorne’s work into a
uniform ideological sludge. The Marble Faun is not sludge; it’s more like
a gumbo, an ideological gumbo full of diverse ingredients that each add
to an overall consistency yet remain distinct. Hawthorne’s work contains
radical elements as well as reactionary ones—its volatile interest in the
female will to power and in female sexuality is as enduringly transgressive as it is phobic; its attraction to Catholicism is at least as fervent as its
calumniating revulsion to it; its uses of the classical past as much denature and defamiliarize the concepts of art and tradition as they exploit
them for conservative, order-cincturing purposes. What the novel asks
us, forces us, to do is to tangle with an endless array of aesthetic as well
as political challenges, to negotiate its confusing, even tormenting, mix
of metaphors and their multivalent purport.
Yet Rowe insists upon this work’s coherence as both ideological product
and ideological agent. Rowe straightens out a queer text—in the effort
to make its ideological impact legible, he must make the work legible as
well. The essential, inescapable quality of the novel, of Hawthorne’s art,
is that it simply cannot be used for any one agenda’s purposes, including
my own: I claim Hawthorne’s radicalism as a critic of heteronormative
standards of gendered identity, but I cannot do so without acknowledging the severe lapses on his part in this regard. Rowe has no difficulty
in presenting us with a Hawthorne whose work accommodates, in its
accomodationist fashion, a coherent ideological agenda. What I want to
suggest is that there are many other ways of responding to a literary work,
or any work of art. A different terminology altogether can be employed
to grapple with the work of what is irreducibly imaginative literature:
beauty, eroticism, perversity. Academic criticism has so long abused these
terms and their values—consider the current use of the word belletristic
as a term of abuse—that perhaps, having been banished for so long, the
terms and their values may now be productively, suggestively defamiliarized and deroutinized, put to new uses.
Gender concerns are indeed addressed in Rowe’s critique. Hawthorne’s
purported gendered infractions include colonizing Hester’s “power as a
‘prophetess’” in “becoming Hester and feeling in his own body the ‘burning heat’ of both her sin and her sex” (96), an experience he notes in the
moment of “The Custom-House” essay in which he recalls (in a famous
duplicitous literary flourish) having donned his heroine’s symbolic letter.
Miriam Schaefer, the mixed race, possibly Jewish heroine of The Marble
Faun “embodies the threat of liberated femininity in the arts and politics”
that apparently earned Hawthorne’s opprobrium (100). For several reasons, Rowe’s imputations of misogyny to Hawthorne are bizarre. While
not the first to make such imputations, Rowe overlooks the radicalism in
Hawthorne’s empathy for strong, brazen, difficult women in the novel-
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romances. The act of placing Hester’s gravely freighted symbol on his
own chest literalizes Hawthorne’s connection to women, femininity, and
female experience. The Scarlet Letter continues to affect readers all over
the globe profoundly precisely because Hawthorne makes Hester’s subjectivity so complex, arresting, and interesting, qualities achieved precisely
through Hawthorne’s imaginative empathy with woman’s experience
(however ambivalent his overall treatment). Similarly, The Marble Faun’s
Miriam and Zenobia in The Blithedale Romance may indeed be threatening figures, but Hawthorne also contrasts their vitality and strength to
the brute oppressiveness of the male characters in the novels—however
powerful and compelling they may be, they are nevertheless victimized by
masculinist men who attempt to control and thwart them. It is hard not
to see Rowe’s critique of Hawthorne on gender as halfhearted, a “While
we’re on the subject of Hawthorne’s political failures . . .” gesture. By
conscripting Hawthorne into a political plot, Rowe forces the unyieldingly apolitical Hawthorne to yield. Regeneration through violence is no
less the recourse of the critic than it is of the fictionist.
Given the sensitivity and complexity of Rowe’s treatment of Henry
James, whose gendered and sexual themes Rowe examines in his study
The Other Henry James, Rowe’s adamantly ideological treatment of Hawthorne is especially striking and troublesome.19 One gets the sense that
something particularly maddening and exasperating about Hawthorne
exists for Rowe, whose interrogation of Hawthorne’s work renders it
inert and ideologically suspect.

Arac and Action
Jonathan Arac’s elegant “The Politics of The Scarlet Letter” remains
indelibly an index of the poststructuralist critique of Hawthorne’s work,
centering on the slavery question that Hawthorne, by all accounts, kept
ducking. Bercovitch took a different but like-minded and equally influential tack, arguing that Hawthorne’s ambiguity works to facilitate the
proper functioning of the “office of the scarlet letter” on Hester Prynne,
who, in Bercovitch’s argument, learns how to become properly socialized
by renouncing her sexuality, thereby joining in with the dictates of her
community. The issue of slavery and Hawthorne’s response to it is of vital
importance, particularly considering Hawthorne’s years-long, passionate friendship with his former Bowdoin classmate Franklin Pierce, the
Fourteenth President (1853–1857), and political appointments within the
Democratic Party. Yet what remains curious in Arac’s approach—which I
view as emblematic of the broadly Foucauldian approach to nineteenthcentury American writing he and Bercovitch innovated—is his reliance
upon masculinist gendered standards.
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First, Arac rather nostalgically reclaims Hawthorne, along with Harriet
Beecher Stowe, as a self-consciously political author writing in a time
when it “was not yet taken for granted that literature must be intransitive,
useless as well as harmless.”20 Hawthorne, Arac notes, “recognized slavery
as potentially divisive, and he did not favor slavery; he only urged that
nothing be done about it” (254). Hawthorne “envisaged” the “logic of
romance” for American politics, since he shuddered at the thought of the
“horrible convulsion,” “this dreadful convulsive action” as Sophia Hawthorne echoed it, of the Civil War. “Action is intolerable; character takes
its place,” Arac surmises. Hawthorne inherits the Romantic reinterpretation of Hamlet, its rejection of Aristotelian theories of character as one
who “acts.” Now, as Hawthorne’s narration-heavy writing demonstrates,
literary character becomes “one who is known” (255). “Hawthorne’s
name circulated as a sign in a complex system of exchange that made
it worth the [Democratic] party’s while to provide him a livelihood and
that gave him the character of a Democrat without requiring action”
(256). Reminding us of Hawthorne’s “abject identity with Coverdale” in
Hawthorne’s 1852 novel The Blithedale Romance, Arac reduces Hawthorne’s
life and work to a philosophy of “Let others do it” (260).
Like Cheyfitz, Arac chafes against Hawthorne’s apparently “immoral
passivity.” But Arac blinds us to the political work undertaken by the
novel, perhaps failing to see that it is precisely through Coverdale’s misanthropy, through Hawthorne’s own perversity, that this political work is
conducted. As Irving Howe wrote of the novel in his essay “The Politics
of Isolation,” Hawthorne harshly critiques the utopian’s impulse to “cut
himself off from the ugly world.” In order “to preserve his utopia,” he
must “become a ‘practical agriculturist’—which means to model his
utopia upon the society he rejects. This criticism, which strikes so hard
a blow at the political fancies of many 19th century American intellectuals, is advanced by Hawthorne with a cruel and almost joyous insistence,
but that does not make it any the less true. Hawthorne, of course, was
as far from the Marxist imagination as anyone could be, but almost any
criticism of utopian politics from a point of view committed to struggle
within the world would have to render a similar judgment.”21 Hawthorne’s
identification with Coverdale does more than simply confirm Hawthorne’s
love of inaction, his aesthetic and social politics of “uselessness.” It also
reminds us that Hawthorne’s work critiques the very same stringent gendered standards that undergird (unwittingly, I presume) critiques such
as Arac’s. Coverdale is many unpleasant things, but he is also a severe
critic of the misogyny and hypocrisy embodied in the most ambiguous
character in the book, the social reformer Hollingsworth, the object of
the novel’s most stinging critique.22
Arac and Rowe sound an awful lot like the people in Hawthorne’s
circle who frowned at his effeminacy. “The self-doubts, the uncertainty,
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the sense that even his best gifts were not entirely admirable did little
to enhance Hawthorne’s confidence in his own masculinity. In this
area, too, he was split, and in ways recognizable to his contemporaries.
Lowell, Longfellow, Alcott, Emerson, and Margaret Fuller all observed
a doubleness of sensibility to which Julian Hawthorne also attested.
These observers reported traits of coyness, passivity, and an intuitiveness regarded as feminine but mingled with a genuine manliness. They
reported the double sensitivity without sneers, but rather as indicative of
a fuller nature than uniformity would produce.”23 Hawthorne always had
his champions, but sneers certainly came his way as well. For example,
in his June 13, 1838 journal entry, Emerson wrote of Hawthorne: “Alcott
and he together would make a man.”24 Overall, Hawthorne’s gendered
identity quivered with anxieties threatening to spill out at any time. As
Brenda Wineapple reports, even the early praise Hawthorne received
could be irritatingly suggestive of his gendered instabilities. “Park Benjamin went so far as to characterize ‘the soul of Nathaniel Hawthorne’
as ‘a rose bathed and baptized in dew,’ a maddening, insulting phrase
that Hawthorne caught.”25 Hawthorne’s gendered intermixture was both
deeply appealing and vexing for many, certainly for himself; it continues
to be vexing to several critics.
The rigid impulse to transmogrify all aesthetic production into political “action” relies upon a hierarchical logic of categories of gendered
identity and qualities, with masculine action, rationalism, certainty, and
absolutism at the very top. These are the very standards that informed
and organized the Jacksonian man-on-the-make manhood that Hawthorne
both supported and critiqued in his work and continue to shape standards of normative American manhood. Arac’s critique of Hawthorne’s
inaction echoes longstanding Puritan clichés conflating idle hands and
devil’s work, his rhetoric remarkably similar to that of the antebellum
reformers in their screeds against the sensual lassitude to which young
men especially were susceptible and which almost inevitably led to the
pernicious solitary vice of onanism. Moreover, the indolence of the
inactive male writer coalesces rather too easily into such calumniated
antebellum categories such as foppishness and luxury, which rendered
the male subject who fell into them feminized.26 Certainly, I, too, cringe
at Hawthorne’s political lapses, most kindly termed his moral myopia. But
I also cringe at the aspects of leftist thought that uncritically perpetuate
biases that rely upon gendered conventions and commonplaces. 27

Decadent Liberalism
Writing in a 1983 collection of Marxist-Foucauldian feminist essays,
Powers of Desire, psychoanalytic theorist Jessica Benjamin made the point

masculinist theory and romantic authorship

983

that any political criticism had to take account of “the erotic, fantastic
components of human life.”28 Benjamin’s advice has not been heeded,
particularly in leftist criticism, which eschews the erotic, reifies the fantastic into further political product, and overlooks or obscures the importance of personal fantasy to the reading of literature. Critically occluded
and duplicitously presented (in that the presentation purports to take
seriously what it only obligatorily makes note of), textual desire—desire
as it emanates from the shared space of the author’s mind, the text, the
reader’s mind, and the mutual needs of each to give life to the other—
remains a crucial aspect of the work, in all of the multivalent capacities
of the term, of literature. In its obfuscation of desire, leftist criticism
fails to recognize it as a category of human experience, as relevant as
any other, to say nothing of its importance to literary art or its role in
political matters.29 Moreover, psychoanalysis—despite its considerable
ideological lapses, the major discipline to treat issues of both gender
and desire—rarely receives mention, and, when it does, this attention is
mostly dismissive if not derisive.30
The oft-stated goals of leftist criticism remain salutary ones. We have
to continue to wage our battles against the myriad forms of oppression,
both as that oppression manifested itself in the past and takes shape
in the present. Yet the manner in which academic criticism goes about
dismantling the machines of oppression mechanizes literature and the
act of critical appraisal; it turns the text into a machine, the critic into
the ultimate machinist. The particular kind of leftist criticism I’ve been
examining here insists upon the material reality of all aspects of art. In
so doing, it proceeds from a fatal literal-mindedness that reflects what
Irving Howe called “the mania for certainty,” in this case the absolutist
insistence on the empirical verifiability of every literary quality.31 Literature is always about ideological commitments, but it is also no less deeply
an attempt, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has put it, to say the unsayable; it’s
precisely this fundamentally unrationalizable aspect of literature that leftist criticism fails to acknowledge and that causes it the greatest amount
of consternating difficulty.32
I propose that what we need instead of this new literary positivism is a
decadent liberalism, one as alive to the perverse and unstable qualities of art
as it is to the pressing, profound ideological realities of which literature
is not only a response but also a reflection. We need a liberalism that
can encompass the disorientingly wide range of effects, concerns, qualities, achievements, failures, and maddening paradoxes of literature, of
all art. This liberalism is decadent in at least two senses of that term—it
acknowledges its own failure (no system can be the complete filter for
all that passes through it), and it embraces perversity (both its own as
a methodology and that within the objects it studies). Leftist literary
criticism needs to make a place for the erotic and for fantasy, for the
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inexpressible and the irreducibly mysterious, for the irrational, in short,
for the perversities of literary art.
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